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ABSTRACT 
Charles Dana Talcott: Codetermination’s Effect on Firm Performance through the Great 
Recession: A Cross-Country Analysis between Germany and the United Kingdom 
(Under the direction of David Ravenscraft) 
 
 This thesis examines the effects of German codetermination on firm profitability, 
productivity, employment, and wages. In addition to laying out the theoretical considerations 
regarding codetermination, this thesis contains a review of the empirical studies of 
codetermination conducted to date and a unique study comparing German and British firms 
through the Great Recession (2007–2010) and the recovery thereafter (2011–2014). Using four 
multiple regression models, I compare a sample of German codetermined firms (n = 71) with a 
comparable set of British firms (n = 291) that feature no board-level employee representation. 
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that property rights theorists are incorrect in 
concluding that codetermination causes firms to underperform. These findings are consistent 
with the results of previous studies of codetermination. At the end of this thesis, I outline several 
promising areas for future research on codetermination.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
German Codetermination as Corporate Governance 
Codetermination refers to the practice of employees partaking in the management of their 
firms. Fundamentally, Germany exhibits two forms of worker representation as the legal code 
mandates. The first is plant-level works councils (Betriebsrat), and the second is supervisory-
board-level employee representatives (Arbeitnehmvertreter). Works councils are groups of 
employees and oftentimes union members that act as a conduit for information and negotiation 
between upper management and floor-level workers. Specifically, they relay important 
information about plant closures, layoffs, internal transfers, or changes in work practices. During 
the occurrence of such major events, works councils also negotiate compensation for affected 
employees. Researchers have extensively investigated this form of codetermination’s effect on 
company performance. Therefore my research focuses on the other form of codetermination: 
employee representatives at the supervisory-board-level (Wagner, 2011). 
As shown in Table 1.1 describe, three types of supervisory board-level codetermination 
exist in Germany today. The first is full-parity codetermination, which only applies to the steel, 
iron, and coal mining industries and grants half of the supervisory board seats to employee 
representatives. The second form is quasi-parity codetermination, which applies to German 
companies in all industries with more than 2,000 employees. This system is the same as full-
parity codetermination in terms of equal representation between shareholder and employee 
representation, except that on quasi-parity boards shareholders hold a tie-breaking vote in the 
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event of a stalemate. Finally, the third version of codetermination allocates one-third of the 
supervisory board seats to employee representatives in German companies of all industries with 
more than 500 but less than 2,000 domestic employees (Pejovich, 1978). 
While all employee representatives on the supervisory board protect the interests of the 
workers, four subgroups elect them, which naturally directs their efforts. The first three groups 
that elect employee representatives are managerially compensated, salaried, and wage-earning 
employees. Each of these groups elects a number of representatives proportional to their 
percentage of the employee population at the firm. The fourth group is composed of unions, 
which always elect one-third of the employee representatives on the supervisory board. Although 
these boards can be as large as 21 members, the total number of board members and employee 
representatives is a function of the number of domestic employees at the firm, with the caveat 
that because the managerial employees are typically far less numerous, they are guaranteed at 
least one representative (Pejovich, 1978).  
 Unlike the Anglo-American model, in which one management board exclusively 
comprised of shareholder representatives governs the firm, German law requires a two-tiered 
structure with an executive board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). While the 
executive board manages the business as the executive directors of a U.S. company would, the 
supervisory board acts as a monitoring body. Officially, the role of the supervisory board is to 
approve significant strategy decisions, including Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A), financing, 
selection (or dismissal) of the management board members, and plant openings or closings. In 
practice, however, the supervisory board acts more as an advisor in cooperation with 
management (Wagner, 2011). Moreover, amendments to German corporate law since the late 
1990s have empowered the supervisory board to provide ex-ante as well as ex-post guidance to 
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the firm (Jungmann, 2006). In other words, the board can now address problems before they 
arise. 
Although the function of the supervisory board has evolved in response to changing 
business conditions and organizations, German law has dictated a consistent structural 
framework of codetermination since the Weimar Republic. I discuss the historical development 
of codetermination in the following section.  
The Legal Framework and Development of Codetermination 
The roots of employee representation in Germany began after the country’s 1848 
revolution, and the manifestation of codetermination within companies has since mirrored the 
political landscape throughout modern German history. Originally, socially-minded employers 
established works councils under their own volition during the latter half of the 19th century, yet 
these labor-friendly organizations were rare. In 1900 and 1905, Bavaria and Prussia became the 
first German states (Länder) to mandate plant-level worker representation. In 1920, to quell the 
Rätebewegung, a growing socialist workers’ movement bent on entirely appropriating firms, the 
government of the Weimar Republic passed the Works Council Act, which established both 
works councils and small amounts of board-level representation (Betriebrätegesetz) (Müller-
Jentsch, 2015). These representatives were the first instances of codetermination in Germany. 
Despite this attempt at compromise, however, far-left and communist parties protested outside 
the Bundestag until police opened machine-gun-fire to restore order in Berlin (Berthelot, 1924). 
Political forces in Germany continued to suppress further expansion of codetermination in the 
country until after the fall of the Nazi Empire. 
Since the Second World War, codetermination legislation has successively empowered 
German workers. Starting the movement, occupying British forces established “full-parity” 
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codetermination in the centralized Ruhr coal and steel industries in order to prevent 
nationalization. Shortly thereafter, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed the 1951 
Act on Codetermination in the Mining, Iron, and Steel Industries 
(Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz), thereby codifying the British-imposed full-parity system into 
German law. One year later, the passage of the 1952 Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) spread one-third codetermination to all companies with more than 
500 employees in the German economy (Müller-Jentsch, 2015). Despite the government 
successively enacting pro-labor legislation, however, workers remained unsatisfied. They wanted 
full-parity representation in all industries.  
In 1976, unions came within a tiebreaking vote of achieving this long-held goal. The 
1976 Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesezt) mandated “quasi-parity” representation on 
the supervisory boards of all German corporations with more than 2,000 employees. As 
explained previously, this system of codetermination is identical to full-parity except that 
shareholders retain a tie-breaking vote in the event of a stalemate (Mertens & Schanze, 1979).  
Table 1.1 
Forms of Codetermination in Germany Today 
Law Name (English) Law Name 
(German) 
Year 
Enacted 
Company 
Category 
Allotment 
Act on 
Codetermination in 
the Mining, Iron, 
and Steel Industry 
Montanmitbestimmung 1951 > 1,000 
employees in 
the mining, 
iron, and steel 
industries 
Full-Parity 
Third Part Act of 
2004 (forerunner: 
1952 Works 
Constitution Act) 
Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) 
2004 
(1952) 
> 500 
employees;   
< 2,000 
employees 
One-Third 
Employee 
Representation 
Codetermination 
Act of 1976 
Mitbestimmungsgestz 1976 >= 2,000 
employees 
Quasi-Parity 
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The State of Codetermination in Germany Today 
Although codetermination rights have consistently expanded throughout modern German 
history, the corporate governance system remains a contentious issue. For instance, corporate 
governance experts have attributed the Volkswagen emissions scandal to codetermination’s 
effect on the supervisory board’s monitoring role. Specifically, critics claim that the shareholders 
relinquished the oversight responsibilities to management to avoid having to compromise with 
worker representatives (Elson, Ferrere, & Goossen, 2015). Likewise, in 2008 a Nuremberg court 
sentenced Johannes Feldmayer, a member of the Siemens’ management board, to two years in 
prison for paying $38 million in bribes to a supervisory board member representing the 
Association of Independent Employees union. Feldmayer reportedly paid off the employee 
representative to gain further control over the company and reduce the influence of the powerful 
IG Metall union. Not only did the scandal cost the company more than $500 mm, but it also 
shows codetermination enabling yet another corporate governance disaster at one of the largest 
companies in Germany (DW Staff, 2008). 
Even more recently, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Europe’s 
highest court, has threatened to altogether disband codetermination in Germany. In January 
2017, the CJEU accepted a case filed on the grounds that Germany’s system of codetermination 
discriminates against foreign workers in German companies because they cannot vote in 
elections for their supervisory board representatives (Weiss & Höpner, 2017). Martin Höpner, a 
political scientist at the Max-Planck-Institute, said in an interview with Social Europe that a 
ruling against codetermination “would probably lead to the disappearance of employee 
representatives from supervisory boards” (Weiss & Höpner, 2017). Such a decision would force 
the restructuring of every large German company supervisory board—not just undoing financial 
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models globally, but also terminating Germany’s century-old corporate governance practice. Last 
November, the CJEU decided against the plaintiff, but this case represents yet another threat to 
the persistently besieged German system of codetermination. Meanwhile, countries like the 
United Kingdom and the United States—champions of the shareholder theory system of 
corporate governance—are considering expanding the rights of workers within the corporate 
framework (Weidenfeld, 2016). I discuss this rising phenomenon in the United Kingdom in the 
following section. 
Corporate Governance and Codetermination in the United Kingdom 
 In contrast to the German two-tiered system of corporate governance, companies in the 
United Kingdom have only one board of directors. The standard British board is basically a 
combination of the German supervisory and management boards. Indeed, a British board of 
directors typically consists of both executive and non-executive directors and performs the 
functions of monitoring company strategy, approving key appointments, and setting standards of 
conduct within the firm. Although German and British boards are relatively similar in terms of 
member composition and function, the systems diverge by the fact that British board members 
exclusively represent shareholders. To be sure, British law does not provide for any employee 
representatives on company boards. 
 Despite a weak history of employee representation, however, the UK government 
recently signaled that the country may implement some form of codetermination in the near 
future. The UK last seriously considered implementing codetermination in the late 1970s in 
response to pressure from the European Union (EU), British Parliament, and the general public, 
resulting in a government-commissioned report on board-level employee representation, known 
as the Bullock Papers (Davies, 1978). This, movement ultimately failed to result in 
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codetermination’s establishment in the country. In a change of direction, however, British Prime 
Minister Theresa May wrote the following in an August 2017 piece for the Daily Mail:  
Listed companies will choose the best way to do this in their businesses – but we will set 
an expectation that they should have in place either an employee advisory panel, or a 
dedicated board member, or an employee representative on their board. (May, 2017)  
This statement is interesting because it demonstrates a complete reversal of the traditional 
corporate governance dogma in Europe. Britain was once the leading force against 
codetermination, but is now reconsidering it. At the same time, Germany, once the biggest 
proponent of codetermination, is having doubts about its own system of worker representation. 
At this crossroads for leaders of countries featuring very different corporate governance systems, 
this thesis attempts to answer the following question: How does German codetermination affect 
firm performance relative to the UK shareholder-focused system of corporate governance? 
 The rest of this paper consists of four sections. In the following chapters, I explain the 
theoretical considerations regarding employee representation, the empirical studies on the subject 
to date, my own empirical analysis of codetermination, and the conclusions of my thesis.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Theoretical Considerations 
In this section of my literature review, I discuss the theoretical considerations regarding 
codetermination and explain how they form the framework for my empirical analysis. First, I 
examine two theories of corporate governance pertaining to codetermination’s effect on firm 
decisions: (1) participation theory; and (2) property rights theory. I later formulate eight 
hypotheses estimating how codetermination has affected firms through the Great Recession from 
a theoretical perspective. 
 Participation theory applied to codetermination.  Generally speaking, participation 
theorists argue that codetermination provides a communication channel between employees and 
employers, which increases total firm value (Freeman & Medoff, 1979; Freeman & Lazear, 
1995; Hart, 1995). Freeman and Medoff (1979) explained that labor representatives do not 
simply dilute managerial authority and lobby for wage hikes, but that they also give “voice” to 
employees, which can help employers and employees avoid turnover costs. Indeed, Freeman and 
Medoff argued that labor participation increases firm surplus by helping owners and workers 
reach compromises through dialogue.  
Likewise, Freeman and Lazear (1995) viewed labor representation as having the potential 
to provide firms a net benefit for several reasons. They argued that although dialogue is time-
consuming, employers and employees exchanging their unique insights leads to better problem 
solving. By their logic, labor representation incentivizes workers to give their opinions because 
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management will have to listen, and conversely, employees will be more willing to comply with 
austerity measures during times of financial stress because they will have reliable information 
concerning the firm’s performance. Overall, this relationship promotes a long-term perspective 
amongst employees—not only increasing their commitment to the firm but also encouraging 
their investment in firm-specific skills (Freeman & Lazear, 1995). 
Hart (1995) confirmed this analysis by reasoning that corporate governance decides 
future questions that employment contracts (for both managers and workers) cannot anticipate. 
For instance, because managers’ contracts are incomplete, an irresponsible manager could 
expose the firm to too much risk and even bankrupt it altogether. Employees, however, are 
generally unlikely to be compensated on the basis of company performance, so they are risk 
averse. Thus, labor representation in corporate governance restrains the overly ambitious 
manager and gives employees a level of protection into perpetuity.  
 Property rights theory applied to codetermination. The other theoretical consideration 
commonly involved in the debate concerning codetermination is property rights theory. This 
theory states that risk exposure incentivizes shareholders to make decisions that maximize the 
value of their property more so than any other party. By this logic, stripping owners of any 
amount of their voting power on major firm decisions and transferring it to labor representatives 
inhibits wealth creation (Furubotn, 1978; Pejovich, 1978).  
Accordingly, Furubotn (1978) and Pejovic (1978) argued that codetermination has an 
overall negative effect on firms and broader society because it misaligns incentives. With regard 
to corporate governance, they argued that shareholders bear the risk of losing their investments, 
so they are the best stewards of those firms. In Furubotn’s own words:  
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At base, there is a problem because an inefficient incentive structure is created [with the 
establishment of codetermination]. Workers are granted rights to make decisions 
affecting the capital assets of the firm but have no responsibility for supplying this 
capital, and no long-term claim on the income derived from it. In consequence, the 
owners of capital, and ultimately society, are forced to assume the risk of decisions made 
each period by a group of individuals not primarily interested in the preservation of 
capital. (p.164) 
In addition, Pejovich (1978) explained that mandatory labor representation is harmful 
because firms cannot direct income efficiently or choose their optimal organizational structure. 
Indeed, labor representatives’ rent-seeking behavior diverts a greater portion of firms’ profits 
into employees’ pockets rather than other investments. According to Pejovich, this forced 
distribution of wealth is problematic not only because investment is the foundation for value 
creation but also because effectively mandating greater compensation for workers reinforces the 
notion that firms exploit labor to generate profit. Moreover, the government enacting 
codetermination by fiat devalues the public’s perception of alternative forms of corporate 
governance, which is problematic for socio-political as well as business reasons. 
With regard to organizational structure, Jensen and Meckling (1979 proposed that if 
codetermination is a more effective corporate governance model, market forces would cause 
firms to establish labor representation under their own volition. The authors explained that in 
almost no cases do firms adopt codetermination on their own but rather governments must force 
the system upon business owners. In Jensen and Meckling’s own words, “The fact that this 
system seldom arises out of voluntary arrangements among individuals strongly suggests that 
codetermination or industrial democracy is less efficient than the alternatives which grow up and 
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survive in a competitive environment” (p. 473). While Jensen and Meckling (1979 and Pejovich 
(1978) are correct according to the theory that market forces will lead firms to choose the 
optimal organizational structure in order to remain competitive, Dilger (2002) offers a rebuttal.  
Dilger (2002) argued that codetermination may not develop organically because the 
decision to establish it signals internal problems with the capital markets. Such a reorganization 
of the corporate structure not only entails costs intrinsic to establishing new governing processes 
at the firm, but doing so also necessitates shareholders trading away decision rights in exchange 
for a better communication channel between management and plant-level workers. Investors and 
creditors may view shareholders voluntarily giving up any amount of control over their assets as 
evidence of an underlying problem because shareholders have no obvious reason to relinquish 
decision-making rights without gaining something that creates value, such as problem-solving 
communication channels (Renaud, 2007). As it relates to codetermination, the only likely benefit 
to shareholders is the increased information exchange participation theorists insist on, so 
onlookers logically conclude that something within the firm needs fixing. 
Empirical Studies to Date 
 In this section of my thesis, I outline the existing empirical literature regarding 
codetermination and explain how my study contributes to this body of work. While many studies 
examine the effects of works councils on company performance, relatively few have investigated 
the impact of employee representation at the supervisory board level. I outline this relatively 
small collection of literature in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 
Empirical Studies of German Codetermination to Date 
Authors  
(Pub. Year) 
Methodology Years Studied Treatment Results  
(for more codt.) 
Svenjar (1982) Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Regression (OLS) 
1950–1976 1952 Full-
Parity Law 
Insignificant 
effect on 
productivity 
Benelli et al. 
(1987) 
OLS, Variance 
Test, Matching 
1973–1977 and 
1978–1983 
1976 Quasi-
Parity Law 
Insignificant 
effect on stock 
prices 
Gurdon & Rai 
(1990) 
Comparison of 
Mean Values 
1970, 1975, 
1980, and 1985 
1976 Quasi-
Parity Law 
Significant 
negative and 
positive effects on 
productivity and 
profitability, 
respectively. 
FitzRoy & Kraft 
(1993) 
OLS 1975 and 1983 1976 Quasi-
Parity Law 
Significant 
positive and 
negative effects 
on productivity 
and profitability, 
respectively. 
Schmid & Seger 
(1998) 
OLS 1976, 1987, and 
1991 
1976 Quasi-
Parity Law 
Significant 
negative effects 
on market-to-
book ratio 
Baums & Frick 
(1999) 
OLS 1974–1995 Court 
Rulings on 
Quasi-Parity 
Insignificant 
effect on stock 
price 
Gorton & Schmid 
(2004) 
Semi-parametric 
Loess, OLS 
1989–1993 Quasi-Parity 
vs. One-
Third 
Significant 
negative effects 
on market-to-
book ratio 
FitzRoy & Kraft 
(2005) 
Differences-in-
Differences 
(DID), Hausman-
Taylor 
1972–1976 and 
1981–1985 
1976 Quasi-
Parity Law 
Significant 
positive 
productivity 
effect 
Werner & 
Zimmerman 
(2005; as cited in 
Renaud, 2007) 
OLS 2002 and 2003 Union Reps 
on Board 
Significant 
negative effect on 
employment 
Table 2.1 Continued 
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Fauver & Fuerst 
(2006) 
OLS 2003 One-Third 
vs. No Codt. 
Significant 
positive effect on 
Tobin’s Q for 
some subgroups 
Jungmann (2006) DID 1994–2003 British (no 
Codt.) vs. 
German (all 
Codt.) 
Inconclusive 
whether either 
corporate control 
mechanism is best 
Kraft & 
Ugarkovic (2006; 
as cited in 
Renaud, 2007) 
DID, Hausman-
Taylor 
1971–1976 and 
1981–1986 
1976 Quasi-
Parity Law 
Positive effect on 
return on equity 
Vitols (2006) (as 
cited in Renaud, 
2007) 
Comparison of 
median values, 
fixed-fixed effects 
2000-2004 Quasi-Parity 
vs. non-
Quasi-Parity 
Insignificant 
effects on 
profitability and 
market-to-book 
ratio 
Renaud (2007) Hausman-Taylor, 
DID, OLS 
1970–2000 Quasi-Parity 
vs. One-
Third 
Significant 
positive effects 
for productivity 
and profitability 
Petry (2009) OLS Before and after 
1976 and 1998–
2008 
Any Codt. 
vs. No Codt. 
Significant 
negative effects 
on stock price 
Wagner (2011) DID, OLS, 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
2006 One-Third 
vs. No Codt. 
Significant 
positive and 
insignificant 
effects on 
productivity and 
profitability, 
respectively. 
Bermig and Frick 
(2010) 
OLS 1998-2007 All levels of 
Codt. for 
companies 
listed on 
DAX, 
MDAX, and 
SDAX 
Inconclusive 
effects on capital 
market 
performance and 
operating 
performance 
Boneberg (2010) OLS, 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
2006 One-Third 
vs. No Codt. 
Significant 
positive and 
negative effects 
for productivity 
and profitability, 
respectively. 
Table 2.1 Continued 
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Boneberg (2011) OLS 2005-2007 One-Third 
v.s No Codt. 
Inconclusive 
effect on 
employment 
growth 
Kim et al. (2017) DID, OLS 1990-2008 Quasi-Parity 
vs. non-
Quasi-Parity 
Significant 
positive effect on 
employment for 
skilled workers 
and significant 
negative effect on 
wages 
 
Generally, these studies focus on codetermination’s effects on profitability, productivity, 
and shareholder value using a variety of metrics and methodologies, each with its own 
advantages and drawbacks. To date, however, the literature on codetermination is inconclusive 
regarding its effect on not only profitability, productivity, and shareholder value, but also 
employment and wages. As such, my thesis considers the differing perspectives that academics 
propose in the literature and attempts to fill the knowledge gap by analyzing four of the five 
performance measures (omitting shareholder value) via the unique approach of cross-country 
comparison. 
 
 Profitability and productivity. In the past four decades, eight separate studies have 
examined codetermination’s effect on profitability or productivity. Confusingly, however, the 
results of these works have indicated positive, negative, and insignificant effects. Svenjar (1982) 
found that the introduction of the 1952 Codetermination Act (Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz), 
which imposed full-parity codetermination upon the mining, steel, and iron industries, had a 
statistically insignificant effect on profitability and productivity. Meanwhile, studies performed 
by Gurdon and Rai (1990) and FitzRoy and Kraft (2005) revealed a significantly negative effect 
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on productivity as a result of the 1976 Codetermination Act. More recently, FitzRoy and Kraft 
(1993), Renaud (2007), and Wagner (2011) discovered increased codetermination as having a 
positive effect. 
 For profitability, the results are equally dissimilar. While according to Gurdon and Rai 
(1990) and Renaud (2007) the 1976 Act had a significantly positive effect on profitability, 
FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) showed that the same law, which increased worker representation from 
one-third to quasi-parity, had a negative effect on profitability. Similarly, Boneberg (2010) 
compared companies with one-third codetermination to those without any worker representation 
and found that profits at codetermined firms were significantly lower. Wagner (2011) also 
compared companies with one-third codetermination and none at all, and observed an 
insignificant effect on profitability. In a relatively unique study of firms from 2000–2004, Vitols 
(2006; as cited in Renaud, 2007) examined quasi-parity companies and those with lower levels 
of codetermination while testing for differences in profitability and shareholder value. 
Ultimately, Vitols found that quasi-parity had an insignificant effect on both profitability and 
shareholder value.   
 Shareholder value.  In addition to Vitols (2006; as cited in Renaud, 2007), seven studies 
have investigated codetermination’s effect on shareholder value, although the collective results 
are just as inconclusive. On the one hand, Schmid and Seger (1998), Gorton and Schmid (2004), 
and Petry (2009) found an indirect relationship between codetermination and shareholder value. 
On the other hand, Fauver and Fuerst (2006) discovered quasi-parity codetermined companies 
had increased levels of shareholder value as compared with one-third codetermined companies. 
Moreover, the results of Benelli et al. (1987) and Baums and Frick (1999) were statistically 
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insignificant, and Bermig and Frick (2010) observed conflicting results after using both Tobin’s 
Q and total shareholder return as their measures of shareholder value. Indeed, not only do the 
results themselves create a lack of consensus in the literature, but so do the measures of 
shareholder value (e.g., Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratio, and stock price).  
 Employment and wages. As for codetermination’s effect on wages and employment, the 
literature is even more sparse. There have been three studies that examined worker 
representation’s effect on employment and just two have looked at wage growth. Despite their 
small numbers, however, the studies still reach varying conclusions. Werner and Zimmerman 
(2005) found an indirect relationship between union representatives and employment growth, 
while Boneberg (2011) found insignificant results. Meanwhile, Kim et al. (2017) identified 
skilled workers in quasi-parity codetermined firms as enjoying significant protection during 
employment shocks. Kim et al. also recognized wages in codetermined firms as dropping more 
during times of financial stress while employment remained relatively high. Thus, their study 
identified wages as absorbing the cost-cutting efforts of firms rather than layoffs. Kim et al. 
described codetermination as “an ex post mechanism to enforce implicit insurance contracts,” 
between employers and employees (p. 3). Meanwhile, Svenjar (1981) observed the introduction 
of the 1952 Act as increasing wages significantly in the iron and steel industries but having an 
insignificant effect for coal mining companies.  
In his concluding remarks, Svenjar (1981) identified the important reality that applies to 
all studies of codetermination. Namely, he explained that nuances of the various systems of 
codetermination in each industry may cause the differing results observed across all studies of 
codetermination. Indeed, just as subtleties may distinguish the manifestation of full-parity 
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codetermination in the coal mining industry from that of the iron and steel producing industries, 
so may the one-third system of the service sector deviate from the one-third system of the 
manufacturing sector. To be sure, numerous other obstacles prevent empirical studies of 
codetermination from reaching a consensus.  
 Issues with the existing literature. In this section, I discuss some of the issues in the 
literature and how my research as well as future investigations can help overcome them. The 
primary problem in studying codetermination is that the system applies to all companies based 
on size, industry, and country—the three primary criteria for selecting comparable companies. 
As such, when studies compare different levels of German codetermination, they have to 
examine one set of larger companies (quasi-parity, for example) and another set of much smaller 
companies (one-third, for example) unless they examine the time period surrounding the 
introduction of codetermination. Gorton and Schmid (2004) faced this issue as they compared 
one-third and quasi-parity codetermined firms from 1989 to 1993, because during this period no 
significant codetermination legislation came into force. My study seeks to avoid the potentially 
confounding size differences by comparing firms in the United Kingdom (no codetermination) 
with firms in Germany (one-third and quasi-parity).  
 Another problem with the existing literature is that the methodologies of the studies have 
improved over time due to increasing data availability and sophistication of statistical analysis. 
In his 2007 study, Renaud identified Benelli et al. (1987) as using “a very simple empirical 
design” (p. 696). Likewise, Bermig and Frick (2010) noted that the long period of time over 
which their panel data spanned as a key advantage of their study over others. In contrast to their 
work, many other studies use only cross-sectional data, which basically looks only at one period 
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of time for each company in the data set. Although my data set does not extend as many years as 
Bermig and Frick’s, I have complete data for eight years of company performance, which is 
more than the majority of studies conducted to date. Furthermore, Bermig and Frick (2010) use 
multiple regression analysis with models that control for nearly twenty different firm 
characteristics, far more than most other studies of codetermination. The thorough nature of their 
work is why, as I explain in the next section, I follow in their footsteps when designing my 
regression models. 
 Another addition my study makes to the existing literature is an examination of a new 
time period with different business conditions. Because most studies examine company 
performance during the time periods surrounding the implementation of codetermination, 
researchers have scarcely investigated codetermination’s effects since the turn of the millennium. 
While the implementation of codetermination (principally in 1952 and 1976) serves as a 
convenient treatment, which allows for comparison of the same firms as codetermined and non-
codetermined entities, the exogenous events of those time periods are consistent across these 
studies. This lack of diversity in the external business environment presents an opportunity for 
circumstantial factors to act as confounding variables. Indeed, the macroeconomic events 
occurring in Germany in 1983 do not change between FitzRoy and Kraft’s (1993) study and 
Kraft and Ugarkovic’s (2006; as cited in Renaud, 2007) work. As such, examining another time 
period allows for the observation of codetermination’s effects on business in a different context, 
thereby contributing to the literature’s understanding of how worker representation affects 
businesses in all scenarios. Moreover, in the next section, I explain how examining the Great 
Recession offers a unique opportunity to test property rights theory’s conclusions about 
codetermination. 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 In this section, I explain how I assembled my data set and the statistical analysis approach 
I used to test property rights theorists’ hypotheses of codetermination’s effect on German firms 
during and after the Great Recession (2007-2010 and 2011-2014).  
Using the Great Recession as a Magnifier of Board-Level Conflicts 
My thesis is unique in that it analyzes German and British firms during and after the 
Great Recession to evaluate property rights theory. Indeed, not only is the recession a generally 
unexplored time period in the field of codetermination research, but also the stress of it forced 
firms to make difficult decisions about their businesses. As firm faced an increasingly difficult 
business environment, they had to figure out how to remain profitable. Among the options 
supervisory boards considered were cutting wages, laying off workers, and redirecting firm 
strategy. Each alternative had a different impact for shareholders and employee representative, 
and, oftentimes, their interests opposed one another. The principle idea of property rights theory 
is that employee representatives won’t let shareholders do with their firms what they will. As the 
Great Recession presented both employees and shareholders existential questions in many cases, 
this time period should demonstrate the effects of their divergent visions as well as any.  As 
such, I analyze firm data from the Great Recession with the understanding that, if property rights 
theorists are to ever be right, this period should be that time.  
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Hypotheses for Empirical Analysis 
 To reiterate this idea, because firms had to adapt to the economic insecurity of the Great 
Recession, this time period acted as a catalyst for many of the forces at work in codetermined 
supervisory boards. As firms weighed options for dealing with their challenges, employee and 
shareholder representatives likely disagreed on a number of issues. According to property rights 
theory, disagreements between employee and shareholder representatives lead to suboptimal 
solutions that hurt codetermined firms. I test the following eight hypotheses to determine 
whether codetermination affects firms negatively as property rights theorists suggest.  
Operating profit. Property rights theorists argue that employee representatives favor 
investment strategies that benefit themselves and oppose cost-cutting. Because employees are 
interested in the firm not going into bankruptcy in the event of financial stress their influence 
may cause the firm to be less exposed to risk. Although during the recession this reduced risk 
may have helped codetermined firms protect their revenues, property rights theorists point out 
good managers in non-codetermined firms should do this anyway. At the same time, property 
rights theorists expect employee representatives to fight cost reduction measures that hurt the 
employees. After the recession, while the debate may be less adversarial, similar dynamics 
should continue. Considering these suppositions of property rights theorists, I develop the 
following two hypotheses for operating profit: 
 
Hypothesis #1: Operating profit will be lower in codetermined firms during the recession.  
 
Hypothesis #2: Operating profit will be lower in codetermined firms after the recession.  
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Revenue per employee. Property rights theorists argue that employees in codetermined 
firms will generally be less productive and more difficult to lay off. During the recession, 
employee representatives will fight to avoid lay offs. Likewise, the risk averse nature of 
employee representatives I previously explained should protect the firm’s revenues but less so 
than non-codetermined firms with competent managers. After the recession, revenue should 
recover at a slightly lower level to non-codetermined firms, and employment should continue to 
be slightly higher than the competitive market would require. Additionally, in all time periods, 
property rights theorists claim that codetermined firms will attract less skilled and lazy workers 
because those job offer a higher level of job security. As such, I developed the following two 
hypotheses in accordance with property rights theory: 
 
Hypothesis #3: Revenue per employee will be lower in codetermined firms during the recession.  
 
Hypothesis #4: Revenue per employee will be lower in codetermined firms after the recession.  
 
Employment growth. Property rights theorists argue that codetermined companies will 
generally employ more people than non-codetermined companies. Specifically, during the 
recession, employee representatives will attempt to block motions to lay off workers. Likewise, 
union representatives may advocate for increase hiring in all periods to bolster the size of the 
union itself. Despite the influence of union representatives, however, non-codetermined 
companies will have to hire many more workers after the recession to meet rising demand as 
compare with the codetermined companies who were unable to lay off their workers. Therefore, 
property rights theory yields the following hypotheses concerning employment growth:   
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Hypothesis #5: Employment growth will be higher in codetermined firms during the recession. 
 
Hypothesis #6: Employment growth will be lower in codetermined firms after the recession. 
 
Wage growth. Property rights theorists argue that the influence of employee 
representatives will cause codetermined companies to consistently pay their workers higher 
wages than non-codetermined companies. In the case of the recession, all companies will try to 
reduce wages, but, according to property rights theorists, employee representatives will block 
major wage cuts in addition to other cost saving efforts. By contrast, non-codetermined firms 
will do as they please. After the recession, codetermined firms will not have to significantly 
change their wage policy to satisfy workers. Meanwhile, non-codetermined firms will pay 
workers more as demand in the labor market and profits rise. Considering these ideas, I test these 
final two hypotheses regarding wage growth in my empirical analysis:   
 
Hypothesis #7: Wage growth will be higher in codetermined firms during the recession. 
 
Hypothesis #8: Wage growth will be lower in codetermined firms after the recession. 
 
Data selection and collection. The goal of my data collection was to gather one sample 
of as many codetermined firms within Germany as possible and another sample of comparable 
companies, which are not subject to any codetermination laws. To form my data sets, I used two 
databases available through Kenan-Flagler Business School’s Research Tools and Library 
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Resources website, including the Wharton Research Data Services’ BoardEx, and Bureau Van 
Dijk’s Osiris. BoardEx contains data on the boards of directors of more than 770,000 publicly 
listed companies worldwide, with some of the data dating back as far as 1999. Through BoardEx 
I verified the codetermination statuses of the companies in both my codetermined sample and 
non-codetermined sample, which I ultimately constructed from British firms. To that end, I 
filtered out any German firms that did not have at least one-third of their supervisory board 
members designated as worker representatives, and by the same measure, British firms that had 
any worker representatives. Osiris, on the other hand, is a database containing profiles of more 
than 60,000 publicly listed companies. These profiles primarily consist of financial information 
from companies’ annual reports. To complete the samples of codetermined (German) and non-
codetermined (British) companies examined in this research analysis, I matched the companies 
in BoardEx with their profiles in Osiris. 
 Country selection. Aiming to isolate German codetermination’s effect on firms, I chose 
the most similar business environment to Germany that did not commonly feature employee 
representation as a part of its corporate governance system. I began by considering all countries 
within the EU, as many EU countries had similar macro-economic experiences through the Great 
Recession and exhibited generally comparable business environments. Next, I discriminated on 
the basis of board-level worker representation. Of the 25 member states and the three affected 
European Economic Area countries in 2007, only Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Iceland, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Latvia, and the UK did not exhibit any form of worker representation 
as non-executive directors before the Great Recession (Kluge, 2005). At this point, each of these 
countries qualified as candidates for comparison with Germany.  
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Upon further investigation, however, the size of the gross domestic product (GDP) output 
and growth, as well as workers’ influence over firms suggested the UK was the best choice for 
comparison. To the first point, the economies of Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, and Latvia were far too small in 2007 to compare their systems with 
Germany. Indeed, Germany’s $3,444bn GDP in that year was more than 7x Belgium’s, ranking 
as the largest among those European nations. Then, although both Italy’s and the UK’s GDPs of 
$2,234 bn and $2,517 bn are comparable to Germany, Italy’s economy was growing at a 
relatively anemic rate. With just 1.5% GDP growth in 2007, Italy was growing at a rate less than 
half of Germany’s 3.3%. The UK, however, kept better apace at 2.4%.  
As for worker influence, Italian employees have significantly more power due to 
sustained national tripartism (Richardson et al., 2010). Whereas Britain introduced neoliberal 
policies in the 1980s that weakened labor’s influence, no such change occurred in Italy. Indeed, 
Italian unions cover 80% of the workforce as compared with 33% in the UK. Likewise, 
collective bargaining is legally binding in Italy but not Britain. Although Italian employees hold 
less power than employees in codetermined German firms, Italian unions offer some of the same 
protection by requiring employers to obtain employee consent for major changes within firms 
and by protecting employees from restructurings (Richardson et al., 2010). Thus, the UK 
emerged as the best country in which to find non-codetermined companies comparable to 
Germany’s codetermined ones. 
 Forming the German sample. As this thesis investigates how codetermined companies 
performed through the Great Recession, I sought to assemble a sufficiently large sample of firms 
exhibiting codetermination in 2007. Initially, I had hoped to incorporate into the sample only 
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firms with quasi-parity codetermination, as mandated by the 1976 Codetermination Act. 
However, limited access to data required also including firms subject to the Third Part Act of 
2004 which mandates at least one-third employee representation. To that end, I exported all 
companies in the European regional division of BoardEx (which excludes the UK) to Microsoft 
Excel and filtered only for companies headquartered in Germany, yielding 204 results. Then, due 
to the disorganized nature of BoardEx’s output, I developed Excel formulas to identify which 
board members were “Employee Representatives” (BoardEx does not differentiate between 
employee and union representatives) and calculated the percentage of each company’s 
supervisory board consisting of worker representatives. Via this process, I identified 93 and 37 
firms exhibiting supervisory boards consisting of quasi-parity and one-third employee 
representation, respectively. I then matched these companies with their financial and industry 
information in Osiris using their international securities identification numbers (ISIN). Of the 
130 companies studied, 12 quasi-parity and eight one-third codetermined companies were not 
present in Osiris, resulting in a sample set of 110 German firms. Finally, because regression 
requires complete data for all periods I removed firms with any data missing in Osiris from 
2007-2014. This last step resulted in 71 codetermined firms (56 quasi-parity and 15 one-third) 
qualifying for the final sample of codetermined firms used in the regression analysis. 
 Forming the British sample. In collecting the sample of non-codetermined British firms 
examined in this study, I followed a similar process to that of the German data set. First, I 
exported all companies in BoardEx’s UK division and filtered for companies headquartered in 
the UK, yielding 2,124 results. Of these companies only one had an employee representative, 
therefore I removed this firm from the sample. Next, I matched these companies with their 
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profiles in Osiris, resulting in 912 companies in the sample. Because German codetermination 
law applies only to companies with a minimum of 500 employees, I then filtered out any British 
companies in Osiris with fewer than 500 employees in 2007, leaving the sample with 503 firms. 
Finally, as with the German data set, I checked for the completion of information of each 
company from 2007–2014, and ultimately the non-codetermined data set used in the regression 
analysis consisted of 291 companies. 
Empirical Analysis Design 
 In this section, I describe the statistical approach used to examine the differences in 
codetermined and non-codetermined firms. First, I discuss the variables I incorporated in the 
model, and then I explain the structure of the regression analysis. 
 Variables. My analysis uses four multiple regression models to examine the effects of 
codetermination on firms during and after the Great Recession. As shown in Table 3.2, I 
incorporated into the models several dependent variables to measure the impacts of 
codetermination and numerous independent variables to isolate employee representation as the 
sole factor differentiating the firms’ results as much as possible.  
 The four dependent variables I used to study both the direct and indirect effects of 
employee representation on firm outcomes were: operating profit, revenue per employee, 
employment growth, and wage growth. In many cases, the poor business environment of the 
Great Recession forced company boards to decide whether to lay off workers and whether to 
reduce wages. To measure these decisions affecting employees, I included year-over-year 
employee headcount growth (“∆Employees”) and wage growth (“∆Wages”) as dependent 
variables. The recession also caused firms to alter their operations. Indeed, payroll expenses and 
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employee headcount impact operating profit and revenue per employee. Therefore, drawing from 
Bermig and Frick (2010) and Wagner’s (2011) analysis, I included earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) margin (“Profit”) and revenue per employee (“Product.”) as dependent variables 
measuring profitability and productivity, respectively. Each independent variable seeks to control 
for firm-specific characteristics, which would otherwise confound the results of the regression 
analysis.  
To that end, I incorporated “Board Size” as the first independent variable in my analysis. 
As mentioned in theoretical analysis of this thesis, board size offers a tradeoff between ease of 
communication and diversity of opinions. For example, while larger boards may weigh more 
potential solutions to a given problem, they typically experience greater difficulty distributing 
and discussing information due their larger numbers. This variable represents supervisory board 
size for German firms, and the total of non-executive directors for British firms, as non-executive 
directors in the UK sit on the single-tiered board of directors.   
 To control for firm size, I followed the same process as Bermig and Frick (2010). I first 
measured company size by total sales (“Total Sales”). Then, I included a second variable 
representing the natural logarithm of total assets (“Natural Log of Total Assets”). I used the 
natural logarithm because it accounts for the fact that differences of the same nominal value are 
more significant among smaller firms as compared with larger firms. For instance, the difference 
between firms with $1 bn and $2 bn in assets is much more significant than for firms with $100 
bn and $101 bn in assets even though $1 bn separates the firms within each pairing.      
 Additionally, I accounted for firm and industry-specific events with two sets of dummy 
variables. To control for restructuring and M&A activity among firms, I used three variables: 
“M&A: Target,” “M&A: Acquirer,” and “M&A: Vendor.” While the first two are self-
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explanatory, the third indicates whether a firm divested one or more of its businesses in the 
period. Likewise, to control for differences in industries, I assigned companies variables 
according to their one-digit United States Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. 
Together, these variables control for industry-specific shocks and structural differences, as well 
as significant changes in the firms themselves.  
 In order to control for how firms allocate capital, I constructed three more variables from 
the companies’ financial data in Osiris. First, I incorporated the “Debt Ratio” variable to account 
for the disciplining effect of debt, which Bermig and Frick (2010) describe in their study. I 
calculated this variable by dividing the Total Liabilities by Total Assets. The next two variables I 
included in the regression analysis controlled for differences in firms’ production processes, as 
Wagner identified in his 2011 study. The first variable, labeled “Capital Intensity,” represents the 
capital intensity of a firm’s operations. I calculated this figure by dividing the firm’s depreciation 
expense by its total number of employees. Similarly, I followed Wagner’s example in accounting 
for improved processes resulting from a firm’s commitment to innovation. However, due to the 
limited nature of Osiris, I divided research and development (R&D) expenses by total sales to 
calculate this variable, labeled “R&D Costs,” rather than using Wagner’s percentage of 
employees engaged in R&D activities.  
Finally, I used three variables to demonstrate the effect of codetermination and the 
recession. The two variables, “Mid-Recession: Codetermination” and “Post-Recession: 
Codetermination,” quantify the effect of employee representation on the dependent variables 
during and after the Great Recession. The “Recession” variable accounts for the recession’s 
effect itself.  
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Table 3.1.  
Dependent and Independent Variables 
Name Construction Description Source 
∆Employees Year-over-year growth 
rate of employees for that 
year. 
This variable represents 
the percent change in 
the number of 
employees in the firm. 
Osiris 
∆Wages Year-over-year growth 
rate of payroll expenses 
divided by the number of 
employees 
This variable represents 
the percent change in 
the average wage in the 
firm. 
Osiris 
Profit Operating profit This variable represents 
the operating profit of 
the firm for that year. 
Osiris 
Productivity Operating turnover 
(revenue) divided by the 
firm’s total number of 
employees 
This variable represents 
the average amount of 
revenue an employee at 
the firm generates. 
Osiris 
Board Size Codetermined (German) 
firms: total supervisory 
board members 
Non-codetermined 
(British) firms: total 
non-executive directors 
 
This variable 
represents the number 
of non-executive 
directors at both 
German and British 
firms. Because 
German firms have a 
two-tiered board 
structure while 
British firms have 
only one board, I 
construct the variable 
slightly different for 
each set of firms, 
though their meaning 
is the same. 
BoardEx 
Ind: Consumer 
Goods 
Manufacturing 
One-digit SIC industry 
classification number 
This variable 
indicates whether a 
firm’s primary 
business is consumer 
goods manufacturing. 
Osiris 
Ind: Industrial 
Manufacturing 
One-digit SIC industry 
classification number 
This variable 
indicates whether a 
firm’s primary 
business is industrial 
manufacturing. 
Osiris 
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Ind: Trans., 
Comm., Power 
and Sanitation 
One-digit SIC industry 
classification number 
This variable 
indicates whether a 
firm’s primary 
business is 
transportation, 
communication, 
power, or sanitation. 
Osiris 
Ind: Wholesale 
and Retail Trade 
One-digit SIC industry 
classification 
This variable 
indicates whether a 
firm’s primary 
business is whole or 
retail trade. 
Osiris 
Ind: Fin., Ins., 
and Real Estate 
One-digit SIC industry 
classification 
This variable 
indicates whether a 
firm’s primary 
business is finance, 
insurance, or real 
estate. 
Osiris 
Ind: Services One-digit SIC industry 
classification 
This variable 
indicates whether a 
firm’s primary 
business is a service. 
Osiris 
Recession Dummy variable for the 
recession. 
This variable 
indicates whether the 
time period is during 
the recession (2007-
2010). 
WDI 
Mid-Recession: 
Codetermination 
Dummy variable for 
codetermination in 
2007. 
This variable 
indicates whether the 
firm was 
codetermined upon 
entering the recession 
for the recovery 
period (2011-2014). 
BoardEx 
Post-Recession: 
Codetermination 
Dummy variable for 
codetermination in 
2007. 
This variable 
indicates whether the 
firm was 
codetermined upon 
entering the recession 
for the recession 
period (2007-2010) 
BoardEx 
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M&A: Target Dummy variable for  
target companies in a 
merger or acquisition 
for each year. 
This variable 
indicates whether 
another company 
(buyer) acquired or 
merged with the firm 
(seller) in that year at 
least one time.   
Osiris 
M&A: Acquirer Dummy variable for  
target companies in a 
merger or acquisition 
for each year. 
This variable 
indicates whether the 
firm (buyer) acquired 
or merged with at 
least one other 
company (seller) in 
that year.  
Osiris 
M&A: Vendor Dummy variable for  
target companies in a 
merger or acquisition 
for each year. 
This variable 
indicates whether the 
firm (buyer) acquired 
or merged with at 
least one other 
company (seller) in 
that year.  
Osiris 
Natural Log of 
Total Assets 
Natural logarithm of the 
total assets of the firm. 
This variable 
represents the size of 
the firm based on 
assets in a non-linear 
fashion. 
Osiris 
Total Sales Total operating turnover 
(revenue) of the firm. 
This variable 
represents the size of 
the firm based on 
assets in a non-linear 
fashion. 
Osiris 
Debt Ratio The firm’s total 
liabilities divided by its 
total assets. 
This variable 
represents how much 
financial leverage the 
firm has. 
Osiris 
Capital Intensity The firm’s depreciation 
expense for that year 
divided by its total 
number of employees 
This variable 
represents how 
capital intensive the 
firm’s operations are. 
Osiris 
R&D Costs The firm’s research and 
development expense 
for that year divided by 
its total operating 
turnover (revenue). 
This variable 
represents how 
committed the firm is 
to innovation. 
Osiris 
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Regression Analysis 
To estimate the effects of employee representation on firm outcomes through the Great 
Recession, I incorporated these variables into the following four regression models: 
“∆Employees” or “∆Wages” or “Profit” or “Productivity” = α0 + α1 “Board Size” + α2 “Total 
Sales + α3 “Natural Log of Total Assets” + α4 “M&A: Target” + α5 “M&A: Acquirer” + α6 
“M&A: Vendor” + α7 “Ind: Consumer Goods Manufacturing” + α8 “Ind: Industrial 
Manufacturing” + α9 “Ind: Trans., Comm., Power and Sanitation” + α10 “Ind: Wholesale and 
Retail Trade” + α11 “Ind: Fin., Ins., and Real Estate” + α12 “Ind: Services” + α13 “Recession” 
+ α14 “Mid-Recession: Codetermination” + α15 “Post-Recession: Codetermination” + α16 “Debt 
Ratio” + α17 “Capital Intensity” + α18 “R&D Costs” 
In these models, I allowed for a different codetermination effect for during and after the 
recession. To measure the significance of the output, I then applied a t-test to each of the 
variables. I used 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 as the three p-values for significance testing in accordance 
with Bermig and Frick’s (2010) method. Due to the limited number of observations in my study, 
having three levels of significance allowed me to compensate for missing data and finding 
meaning in the regression output. Despite this disadvantage, my data set has the benefit of 
including multiple observations for each firm during and after the recession. This span of data 
allows for a robust analysis of how the firms performed through the period.  
 Regression output. The four regression models yielded the results summarized in the 
Table 3.2. While some of the results were surprising, most of the independent variables reported 
values consistent with my expectations for the data set. On the one hand, that the regression 
showed acquiring a firm has a significantly positive effect on employment growth confirms this 
set of companies as reflecting basic business principles. Likewise, capital intensity significantly 
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increasing revenue per employee makes sense because firms with more capital intensive 
production processes shouldn’t have to employ as many people to produce and sell as many 
goods. On the other hand, however, I did not expect to find that R&D costs had a significantly 
negative effect on productivity and that the recession had a significantly positive effect on the 
same figure. A possible explanation for these confusing results is that I constructed the measure 
of productivity as revenue per employee. As this formula relates to the recession, sometimes 
companies typically have more control over their employee headcount than their revenues, which 
they frequently contract over several years, so, when the recession hit, companies may have laid 
off workers faster than their revenue fell, thereby causing the recession to appear to increase 
productivity. In the same way, firms with higher percentages of their revenues committed to 
R&D costs may have felt increased pressure to lay off employees as the recession hit. 
Nevertheless, I cannot definitively say why these resutls were irregular.  
 As for the variables relating to codetermination, none of the results (presented in Table 
3.2. as “Mid-Recession: Codetermination” and “Post-Recession: Codetermination”) were 
significant at the 1% or 5% levels of significance. During the recession, codetermined firms 
appeared to have slightly higher operating profitability, employment growth, and wage growth in 
comparison with non-codetermined firms. In Hypothesis #1, I predicted that operating profit 
would be lower in codetermined firms. Indeed, according to property rights theorists these firms 
would not be able to fire employees at will, reduce wages without opposition from employee 
representatives, or choose the optimal strategies for maximizing revenue. Yet, while the 
regression coefficient for operating profitability contradicts Hypothesis #1, wage growth and 
employment growth have positive coefficients, which agrees with Hypothesis #5 and Hypothesis 
#7. Nevertheless, these findings are insignificant and, therefore, lack explanatory power. 
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Likewise, the regression results showed codetermination’s effect on revenue per 
employee was positive during the recession. This positive coefficient contradicts Hypothesis #3, 
which predicted productivity would drop during the recession primarily due to owners’ inability 
to lay off workers, the presumption that codetermined firms would have higher levels of risk in 
losing revenue, and workers at codetermined firms are generally less motivated. Indeed, Benelli 
et al’s (1985) theoretical model for understanding the influence of employee representatives on 
supervisory boards supports this notion that employee representatives will influence their firms 
to choose less risky strategies so as to protect the firm and its cash flows during recessions. That 
revenues were slightly more resilient during the recession because of the conservative nature of 
employees may also explain why operating profits of codetermined firms were higher during the 
recession as well. 
 Little seemed to change during the recovery after the recession as all of the coefficients 
retained their signs except wage growth. Hypothesis #2 and Hypothesis #4 predicted that 
operating profit and revenue per employee would be lower in codetermined firms while 
Hypothesis #6 and Hypothesis #8 forecast lower employment growth and wage growth, 
respectively. The coefficients of the codetermination variables indicate that codetermination does 
indeed have a negative effect on wage growth, which is in accordance with Hypothesis #8. Yet 
confusingly, the coefficients for revenue per employee, operating profit, and employment growth 
are positive, indicating codetermination aided profitability, productivity, and net hiring during 
the recovery. In regard to Hypothesis #6, I explained that property rights theorists believe 
because codetermined firms would fire fewer workers during the recession, they would have to 
higher fewer workers to meet the resurgent demand. Not only does this prediction contrast with 
the result of the regression, my findings regarding both employment and wages disagree with 
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Kim et al’s 2017 study. Through their work, Kim et al found that skilled workers in 
codetermined firms enjoyed greater job security at the cost of reduced wages during recessions. 
This sacrifice should cause codetermined firms to have to hire less but boost wages more during 
the recovery, but, apparently, it does not. One explanation for this surprising phenomenon is that 
management may have decreased the hours employees worked during the recession so much so 
that they did not count many of their workers in their full-time employee total for the year, 
effectively firing them. To be sure, however, this justification, is speculation and other factors 
could have caused relatively higher employment growth and lower wage growth among 
codetermined companies during the recovery.  
 Similarly, Hypothesis #4 stated that employee representatives will cause codetermined 
firms to be less productive because they will bloat employment levels and attract less motivated 
workers, and Hypothesis #2 predicted that operating profit would be lower because owners 
would be better stewards of their invested capital. My results regarding profitability and 
productivity in the recovery period, however, indicate the opposite occurred in codetermined 
firms.  
Table 3.2 
Multiple Regression Output 
Variable ∆Employees ∆Wages Profit Productivity 
Board Size -0.60 
(-1.82) * 
0.06 
(0.19) 
-1.19 
(-1.69) * 
-9.46 
(-1.21) 
Ind: Consumer 
Goods 
Manufacturing 
-1.69 
(-0.73) 
-3.66 
(-1.68) * 
2.78 
(0.56) 
-118.47 
(-1.76) * 
Ind: Industrial 
Manufacturing 
-0.04 
(-0.02) 
-4.10 
(-1.90) * 
2.09 
(0.42) 
-202.71 
(-3.09) ** 
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Variable ∆Employees ∆Wages Profit Productivity 
Ind: Trans., 
Comm., Power 
and Sanitation 
5.91 
(2.27) * 
-3.34 
(-1.36) 
2.43 
(0.43) 
10.51 
(0.14) 
Ind: Wholesale 
and Retail Trade 
-2.69 
(-1.04) 
0.68 
(0.28) 
-2.20 
(-0.39) 
-126.11 
(-1.68) * 
Ind: Fin., Ins., 
and Real Estate 
13.39 
(3.15) ** 
-7.05 
(-1.76) * 
19.49 
(2.12) * 
80.85 
(0.65) 
Ind: Services 1.11 
(0.45) 
-5.25 
(-2.24) * 
-4.18 
(-0.78) 
-213.43 
(-2.98) ** 
Recession -1.92 
(-1.42) 
0.44 
(0.32) 
-1.16 
(-0.63) 
19.69 
(4.19) ** 
Mid-Recession: 
Codetermination 
4.02 
(1.19) 
1.69 
(0.52) 
0.88 
(0.13) 
50.39 
(0.60) 
Post-Recession: 
Codetermination 
5.62 
(1.64) 
-0.54 
(-0.17) 
1.11 
(0.16) 
36.01 
(0.43) 
M&A: Target 1.57 
(1.21) 
4.16 
(3.25) ** 
-1.41 
(-0.74) 
0.15 
(0.03) 
M&A: Acquirer 8.56 
(6.53) ** 
-0.52 
(-0.40) 
1.94 
(1.00) 
-2.61 
(-0.51) 
M&A: Vendor -1.27 
(-0.78) 
3.62 
(2.22) * 
-6.93 
(-2.91) ** 
-0.90 
(-0.14) 
Natural Log of 
Total Assets 
0.46 
(0.85) 
-1.15 
(-2.23) * 
6.07 
(5.41) ** 
9.22 
(1.14) 
Total Sales -0.09 
(-0.30) 
-0.05 
(-0.17) 
-0.82 
(-1.36) 
75.66 
(18.41) ** 
Debt Ratio -6.89 
(-2.01) * 
-6.64 
(-2.02) * 
2.89 
(0.44) 
57.45 
(2.21) * 
Capital Intensity -0.04 
(-2.38) ** 
0.07 
(4.72) ** 
-0.10 
(-3.63) ** 
0.78 
(9.72) ** 
R&D Costs -25.08 
(-1.26) 
-3.48 
(-0.18) 
31.51 
(0.76) 
-507.31 
(-1.85) * 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
In this section, I discuss the conclusions I draw from the results of the regression analysis 
and outline the limitations of this study as well as areas for future research. 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, I used regression analysis to compare German and British firms during and 
after the Great Recession. With the results of my regression, I then tested eight hypotheses 
regarding productivity, profitability, employment, and wages, which represented the argument 
against codetermination that property rights theory puts forth. I even made these findings as 
likely to favor property rights theorists as possible by selecting data for comparable companies 
during and after the Great Recession (2007-2010 and 2011-2014), a time of economic stress 
which should have revealed the problems of codetermination that their theory suggests. 
As the results turned out, however, I did not notice any the negative effects for 
codetermined companies that property rights theorists foretold. Indeed, none of the 
codetermination coefficients (presented in Table 3.1. as “Mid-Recession: Codetermination” and 
“Post-Recession: Codetermination”) were significant at the 1% or 5% levels of significance. In 
fact, not only were all of the results insignificant, but several of them indicated that 
codetermination had the opposite effect property rights theorists thought it would. As such, the 
regression’s findings fail to reject all eight of the hypotheses I tested, which indicates property 
rights theorists are incorrect in their belief that codetermination causes firms to underperform. 
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Considering that previous empirical studies on codetermination have yielded mixed 
results and that participation and property rights theorists fundamentally disagree, my results are, 
in a way, consistent with the body of codetermination research. Indeed, numerous studies have 
found codetermination to positively, negatively, and insignificantly affect productivity and 
profitability. Not enough research on codetermination’s effect on wages and employment exists 
to say whether my statistically insignificant findings are typical. My regression analysis indicates 
codetermination has an insignificant effect on performance during a time period that should 
favor the negative consequences of codetermination emphasized by property rights theorists. 
This thesis does not support the notion that board-level employee representation has positive 
consequences that proponents of codetermination (such as participation theorists) promote. 
However, in a severe recession, the conflict between employee goals (higher employment and 
wages) and owner goals (profit and shareholder returns) are the greatest. Therefore, during my 
period of study, the negative impacts should dominate the positive, and they do not. 
Limitations 
In this section, I describe the limitations of my study. Access to data, inherent 
weaknesses of regression analysis, and different macro-economic experiences of Germany and 
Britain not only muddy the findings of my thesis, but also present opportunities for future 
research.  
 Macro-economic differences.  Although Germany and Britain were the best sources of 
comparable companies for this study, they were nevertheless imperfect. The main reason for this 
mismatch is that the Great Recession had a different impact in each country. Perhaps the best 
demonstration of Germany and Britain’s somewhat dissimilar experiences through the Great 
39 
 
Recession is their GDP growth rates. As Table 4.1 shows, while Germany sustained higher 
growth rates during the onset of the recession, the country’s economy shrank more dramatically 
during 2009 than that of the UK. Likewise, while Britain’s recovery was relatively consistent 
with increasing year-over-year growth, Germany surpassed its pre-recession growth benchmark 
in 2010 and 2011 but then stagnated as the global recovery continued. Because the overall 
business environment affects the companies within it, German and British companies’ 
profitability, productivity, wages, or employment levels may differ as a result of the economies 
in which they operate.  
 
Table 4.1 
British and German GDP Growth Rates 2007–2014 
(% Percentages) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Germany 3.3 1.1 -5.6 4.1 3.7 0.5 0.5 1.9 
United Kingdom 2.4 -0.5 -4.2 1.7 1.5 1.5 2.1 3.1 
Source: (“World development indicators,” n.d.)   
 Access to data. Another challenge in designing my empirical study was accessing the 
right data. Initially, I wanted to focus my thesis on one-third codetermined limited liability 
companies, known in Germany by the acronym “GmbH” (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung). This sect of companies intrigued me because within it exists companies of the same 
size, region, and industry with and without codetermined supervisory boards—i.e., ideal 
comparable companies. Boneberg (2010) and Wagner (2011) were the first researchers to 
analyze these types of companies and found codetermination had positive effects on productivity 
and mixed effects on profitability. They were able to explore this new frontier in codetermination 
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research after Boneberg (2009) discovered that about half of GmbHs defy the 2004 Third Part 
Act and do not establish a codetermined supervisory board. Because these studies remain the 
only of their kind, my idea was to build upon this ground-breaking yet insufficiently explored 
body of research. Accessing this data, however, proved too time-consuming and expensive 
because the Statistical Offices of German States hold the data and require that they perform any 
analysis internally for privacy reasons. In fact, upon contacting these offices, I learned that this 
data costs thousands of euros and takes at least six months to analyze. Because of the limited 
time and funding for my research, this high cost and long processing time ruled out using any 
data from the German statistical offices for my study.  
The other database I would have liked to access, but is also prohibitively expensive, is the 
Hoppenstedt Datenbank, which contains codetermination information on more than 300,000 
German companies. Studies on all levels of German codetermination commonly use this 
database to identify the level of codetermination a company exhibits. Rather than using the 
number of domestic employees as a proxy for no, one-third, or quasi-parity codetermination, 
researchers with access to the Hoppenstedt database know the level of codetermination in each 
company as a matter of fact. Because I did not have access to this database or domestic employee 
totals, I used information from BoardEx to determine the percentage of employee representatives 
occupying supervisory boards seats. Although BoardEx suffices, the Hoppenstedt database 
contains profiles of many more companies, which would have made my data set much larger and 
my statistical results more powerful. 
 Statistical analysis. The overarching issue with my statistical analysis was the 
infeasibility of controlling for all factors affecting company performance. Indeed, I cannot 
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account for every exogenous and endogenous influence in my regression models not only 
because of the size of the data set but also because of the availability of certain types of 
information. For example, as I previously explained, the experiences of Germany and the United 
Kingdom throughout the Great Recession were different in many ways. Although GDP growth 
summarizes the economics to a degree, it alone is not robust enough to account for all of these 
differences, and such all-encompassing data does not exist. Moreover, many of the influences 
affecting company performance are unobservable. For instance, German managers may behave 
differently than British managers, and I cannot account for differences in the thought-processes 
of individuals. Finally, even if I could access data for these types of minute influences on firm 
performance, my sample size would have to be large enough to accommodate these numerous 
independent variables or else the results would lose their explanatory power. As such, my study 
suffers from the problems plaguing all studies of codetermination: a finite data set and the 
impossibility of controlling for all differences in firms.   
Opportunities for Future Research 
 In this section, I describe the paths that future researchers of codetermination should 
pursue. In my mind, three areas present ample opportunity for enhancing our understanding of 
German codetermination and its effects on firms. 
 Ideal one-third codetermined comparable companies. First, future research should 
continue to utilize the data that Wagner (2011) and Boneberg (2010) analyze in their studies. As 
previously mentioned in the limitations sections of this chapter, this data corresponds to German 
limited liability companies with and without one-third codetermined supervisory boards and 
provides two sets of companies that are indistinguishable in terms of geographic region, industry, 
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and size. The only drawback for this type of comparison is that it would not measure the effects 
of quasi-parity codetermination, another common form of codetermination in Germany. Despite 
this drawback, these one-third codetermined data sets are still better for comparison than the 
different classes of companies that researchers, including myself, have had to use in the past, and 
therefore present an exciting opportunity for future research. 
 Cross-country analysis with Belgium. Whether or not Belgium is a better choice for 
cross-country analysis than the UK is a matter of debate. While the UK’s GDP and stature within 
the EU trading bloc is more similar to Germany’s, the Belgian economy more closely reflects the 
German economy, and the two countries share the Euro as a currency and the European Central 
Bank’s monetary policy. Indeed, Belgium’s structure of GDP output was slightly more similar to 
Germany’s than the UK’s was in 2007 (Table 4.2). Importantly as well, Belgium does not 
mandate board-level codetermination. Based on this criteria, isolating codetermination as a factor 
in German and Belgian firms could be easier than with German and British firms, and as a result, 
comparing the performances of Belgian and German firms could yield interesting results 
regarding the effects of codetermination.  
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Table 4.2 
Structure of GDP output in Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom in 2007 
(% Percentages) Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 
Belgium 1 25 17 74 
Germany 1 31 23 69 
United Kingdom 1 21 10 78 
Source: (“World development indicators,” n.d.)  
Case studies and conversations. Case studies of specific company boards and 
conversations with non-executive as well as executive directors present an opportunity to 
discover more qualitative effects of codetermination. Over the course of my research, I spoke to 
Sir Ian Cheshire, former chief executive of Kingfisher and a member of boards in Germany, 
Britain, and France. Through my talking with him I learned that the theories researchers apply to 
codetermination inappropriately define the dynamics at work on boards. Indeed, Sir Cheshire 
explained that employee and shareholder representatives do not invariably oppose each other in 
an adversarial manner, but instead they often work together to reach mutually agreed upon 
solutions. Moreover, he explained that the relationships between board members in Germany are 
different than those between members of UK or French boards. As such, future researchers of 
codetermination should talk to board members and study specific companies to expand their 
understanding of how the boards reach decisions and set the course of the companies they 
govern.   
Countries with similar cultures. Based on the insight Sir Cheshire provided, an 
opportunity for further research exists in studying countries with similar cultures. Germany 
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possesses a unique working culture relative to the United Kingdom, and this endogenously 
determined variable could have obscured the results of this thesis. Comparing two countries with 
more similar cultures would be ideal, but researchers could also look for ways to account for 
such cultural differences in their empirical models or, at least, interpret their results with these 
differences in mind. 
Comparing codetermination and unionization. A final angle to focus on with regard to 
codetermination is unionization. Because unions supposedly fulfill many of the same duties as 
employee representatives on corporate boards, differences between codetermination and 
unionization offer insights to businesspeople and policymakers as how to optimize their 
corporate governance systems. In such a study, the ideal comparison would be a country with 
codetermination but weak unionization and another country without codetermination and strong 
unionization. Such a comparison would expose the differences in the two systems of employee 
representation allowing for a clean examination of the effects of each. 
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